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Abstract
The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select a level of
aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits (rent) to specic groups.
In most circumstances, these decisions are often politically contentious and frequently
inuenced by rent seeking behaviour. In this paper, we use a contest model to analyse the
e¤ects of rent seeking e¤ort when permits are freely distributed (grandfathered). Rent
seeking behaviour can inuence both the share of permits which an individual rm receives
and also the total supply of permits. This latter impact depends on the responsiveness
of the regulator to aggregate rent seeking e¤ort. Using a three-stage game, we show that
rent seeking can inuence both the distribution of rents and the ex post value of these
rents, whilst welfare usually decreases in the responsiveness of the regulator.
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1 Introduction
Tradable pollution markets have become an increasingly mainstream regulatory tool for control-
ling pollution. Since Montgomery (1972), economists have known that under certain conditions,
such markets can achieve an e¢ cient (that is, cost-minimising) allocation of pollution control
e¤orts across polluters, irrespective of the initial allocation of permits by a regulator. This is
because post-allocation trading will allow all potential gains from trades to be realised. How-
ever, the initial allocation of permits has become a matter of political debate, and of increasing
academic interest, since rmsgains and losses can in the real world depend on this initial
allocation. Moreover, since permits are valuable, allocation creates rents, over which rms can
be expected to compete ex ante by rent seeking. In many existing tradable permit markets,
regulatorsdecisions over the distribution and absolute level of emissions have often been inu-
enced by interested parties (see, for example, Svendsen (2005)).1 This inuence, in the form of
rent seeking, is seen as socially unproductive and often as a signicant and sustained problem.
An important question is thus how rent seeking strategies are determined in tradeable permit
markets, how this inuences social welfare, and whether this depends on the degree to which
a regulator allows rent seeking to determine both the distribution and absolute level of these
rents. Our conclusion is that when regulators are responsive to aggregate rent seeking then rent
seeking strategies for tradable permits di¤er signicantly from standard (non-tradeable) rents.
This is a direct result of rms having the ability to trade pollution permits which produces an
equilibrium price e¤ect. When the regulators responsiveness to aggregate rent seeking increases
we nd this usually results in a decrease in welfare, so that the damage caused by the increase
in aggregate emissions outweighs any decrease in rent seeking from a reduction in the permit
value.
In this paper we use a contest framework to analyse rent seeking. A typical contest allows
agents to invest in e¤ort in order to win a prize (Congleton et al., 2008). This approach has
been used successfully in many areas such as litigation, political campaigning, labour market
promotions, conicts, R&D patent races and sports events (Konrad, 2009). One important
application of contest theory is rent seeking. Starting from the seminal works of Krueger
1For the SO2 market see http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/basic.html and for the EU-ETS:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm. Anecdotal evidence exists for the existence of
lobbying (from individual senators) in the US SO2 trading scheme (Ellerman et al. 2000) and by industry in
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) (Svendsen, 2005; Ellerman et al. 2007).
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(1974), Posner (1975) and Tullock (1980), a substantial body of work has focused on rent
dissipation issues, where the total rents available for capture across all agents are taken as
xed (for surveys of the literature, see Nitzan, 1994; Congleton et al., 2008; Konrad, 2009).
However, for our model, we allow the total rent to be endogenously determined by aggregate
rent seeking e¤ort (Chung, 1996; Sha¤er, 2006). In the same vein, Chung (1996) extends a
Tullock-style rent seeking contest model to include a rent that is endogenously determined by
aggregate e¤orts and nds that the extended contest generates excessive e¤ort levels which are
socially wasteful. More recently, Sha¤er (2006) nds that e¤ort levels tend to adjust in the
direction of the change in the rent. For example, when the rent is "productive" (where the rent
is increasing in aggregate e¤orts), agents tend to invest more e¤ort in rent seeking. However,
this literature typically assumes that rents are non-tradable, which limits the insights one can
draw when considering tradable pollution permit markets.
A tradable permit market involves an ex post reallocation of rents. It has long been under-
stood that such an ex post reallocation of emission rights can produce an e¢ cient allocation
of emission reductions among polluters (Montgomery, 1972). Few authors, however, have con-
sidered rent seeking contests when ex post reallocation is not just possible but essential to the
operation of the policy instrument. Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) and Sui (2009) nd that al-
though contests are allocatively e¢ cient, e¤ort levels tend to increase when ex post reallocation
is permitted. However, it is not clear how these rents di¤er from standard rents in terms of
agentsrent seeking strategies and regulatory responses. In the context of tradable pollution
permit markets, Lai (2007) has investigated the social welfare consequences of rms and en-
vironmental groups lobbying over the determination of an aggregate emissions cap and nds
allocating freely may be more e¢ cient than auctioning. However, the incentives for rms to
rent-seek for their own private benet (to increase their own individual share of permits at the
expense of rival rms) is not considered by Lai.
In this paper, we introduce a contest where polluting rms have the option to invest in
rent seeking e¤ort that has the potential to increase their own permit allocation within a
tradable permit market and, simultaneously, the aggregate supply of permits from the regulator
(i.e. political pressure to increase individual and aggregate level emissions). We allow the
regulator to select a provisional aggregate emissions target (for example, by announcing draft
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legislation) which can be subsequently inuenced by rmsrent seeking e¤ort. We provide cases
where the regulator views rent seeking as purelysocially wasteful and, alternatively, where the
regulator obtains political contributions from rent seekers. We show the incentives behind rms
rent seeking e¤ort in a tradable permit market and compare this to a standard rent seeking
framework. Our focus is thus on how the market value of the ex post reallocated rent, which is
endogenously determined by the marginal costs of participating rms and the aggregate supply
of permits (which may be determined by rent seeking itself), alters rent seeking behaviour and
social welfare. We nd di¤erences in rmsrent seeking choices compared to a conventional
contest. We see that a fundamental aspect of rms incentives to rent-seek depends on the
market value of the permits, that is, the value of the ex post reallocated rents.
This paper focuses on rent seeking for tradable pollution permits, however, the rationale
can directly apply to more general contests where the prize won has the ability of being ex post
reallocated. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and provides a
benchmark comparison. In Section 3, the rms optimal choice of emissions is determined. In
Section 4, the rms equilibrium rent seeking strategy is discussed for both an endogenous and
exogenously determined rent and aggregate rent seeking e¤ort is then derived. Section 5 inves-
tigates the regulators optimal choice of aggregate emissions and discusses whether alternative
responses to rent seeking can be welfare improving. Section 6 provides some policy implications
and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a set of rms f1; 2; : : : ; ng that participate in a competitive tradable pollution permit
market. In this market, permits are initially allocated freely but each rm has the ability to alter
the amount of permits it receives from the regulator by investing in rent seeking e¤ort denoted
by si for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.2 A unilateral increase in rm is rent seeking investment will result in
2Our results are qualitively similar when one considers a hybrid allocation approach where both auctioning
and grandfathering can be used (where the rent now available for rent seekers is simply the total allocation
minus the permits allocated from the auction). This approach has been advocated by energy companies for
the forthcoming US wide cap-and-trade program (Point Carbon, 2009). Furthermore, our results may provide
analysis on how rms rent seek for permits where allocation mechanisms use "reserves", energy intensity targets
and "safety valves" prior to the beginning of the scheme (Pizer, 2002; Newell et al., 2005). To introduce full
auctioning of permits, the distribution of permits can be modelled as a multi-unit auction (see, Krishna, 2002).
In this case, rent seeking inuences the aggregate level of emissions but not the distribution of permits.
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that rm obtaining relatively more permits prior to the beginning of the market. Additionally,
we allow for the possibility that aggregate rent seeking e¤ort inuences the regulators nal
decision when selecting an absolute level for the aggregate emissions cap. That is, market
participants can apply political pressure on the regulator to increase the aggregate emissions
level.3 Therefore, an increase in rent seeking by rm i increases their share of the "pie" and
provides pressure to increase the absolute size of the "pie". After the initial distribution of the
rents, rms are free to trade and reallocate these permits.
Our model is split into three stages. In stage one, the regulator selects a provisional level
of aggregate emissions for the trading permit market denoted by ~A (such as draft legislation).
In stage two, given this information, each rm invests in rent seeking e¤ort si 8 i to obtain a
share of the aggregate emissions which results in a "nal" aggregate allocation for the permit
market denoted by A. In stage three, the market commences and each rm selects a level of
pollution to emit in the market.
To model how the provisional aggregate emissions level in stage one di¤ers from the nal
emissions level in stage two, we introduce an exogenous political "responsiveness" parameter
 2 [0;1) which is common knowledge among all rms and the regulator.4 The political
responsiveness parameter  represents the political and cultural interactions and governance
relationship between the regulator and regulated rms. When  = 0 the regulator is unre-
sponsive to aggregate rent seeking and the resulting aggregate emissions cap is simply the
provisional aggregate emissions chosen by the regulator ~A. For  > 0, the regulator is respon-
sive to rms rent seeking e¤orts. Formally, the nal aggregate emissions cap A set by the
regulator is determined by
A = ~A 
 
1 + 
nX
i=1
si
!
(1)
where the nal rent available in the contest is endogenously determined by the regulators
initial draft legislation ~A and aggregate rent seeking e¤ort
Pn
i si. We follow a framework
3Importantly, this does not require cooperation between market participants. Each participant rent-seeks
in order to obtain a permit allocation for themselves. It is only as a result of this accumulated rent-seeking
activity that provides pressure on the regulator to increase the aggregate emissions.
4The political responsiveness parameter represents the a¤ect of aggregate rent-seeking e¤ort on the regulators
choice of emissions. Even for values of  = 0, rent-seeking e¤ort will continue to determine the distribution
among rms. Furthermore, an upper bound on  will exist where the responsiveness is su¢ ciently large to
reduce the equilibrium permit price to zero. Negative values of  can also be considered, however, this is less
realistic for the context of rent-seeking for pollution permits. As Sha¤er (2006) explains, allowing for  < 0
results in a destructive contest where the rent decreases in aggregate rent-seeking e¤orts.
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similar to Helm (2003). To solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the model
using backward induction and as a result outline and solve stage three rst.
3 Stage three: rmschoice of equilibrium emissions
In stage three, the tradable permit market commences and rm i selects a level of emissions.
Assuming the equilibrium permit price p and the level of allocation a0i obtained in stage two
is taken as given (and hence the aggregate allocation A nalised in stage two), rm is payo¤
from the tradable permit market is:
max
ei
i = p
(a0i   ei)  ci(ei) for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (2)
where ei is the level of net emissions (inclusive of abatement choices) and ci(ei) is the abatement
cost function where c0i(ei)  0, c00i (ei)  0. The term (a0i ei) shows rm is net supply of permits
to the market (which can also be negative). Given the levels of allocation to each rm (and the
subsequent equilibrium permit price determined by the aggregate emissions), di¤erentiating (2)
with respect to ei yields the following rst order condition:
 p   c0i(ei) = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (3)
which is solved for ei and the market clearing condition is given by
nX
i=1
ei = A (4)
The rst order condition (3) states the familiar result that each rm will choose a level of
emissions to equate their marginal abatement costs with the equilibrium permit price. Condi-
tion (4) is the market clearing condition where, in equilibrium, the aggregate emissions must
equate to the aggregate supply of permits.
Similar to Helm (2003), we di¤erentiate (3) with respect to p and (4) with respect to A
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and obtain:
 1  c00i (ei)
@ei
@p
= 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (5)
nX
i=1
@ei
@p
@p
@A
= 1 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (6)
where substitution yields:
@p
@A
=  
"
1Pn
i=1
1
c00i (ei)
#
< 0 (7)
Expression (7) shows that as the aggregate allocation increases, the equilibrium permit price
decreases. Note that the extent of this depreciation is based on the slope of rmsmarginal
abatement costs, where steeper marginal abatement costs result in a larger change in the
equilibrium permit price. As will be discussed later in the paper, the relationship in (7) is the
key to understanding how rent seeking for ex post reallocated rents (such as pollution permits)
di¤ers from standard rents.
4 Stage two: rmsoptimal rent seeking e¤ort
In this stage, rm i selects a level of rent seeking e¤ort to obtain an initial allocation of permits
for the beginning of the tradable permit market in stage three. Let us assume that in stage one
~A0 was chosen by the regulator where each rm knows that the nal aggregate emissions cap
for the tradable permit market is determined by ~A0 (1 + 
Pn
i=1 si). This rent seeking, from
the view point of society, is unproductive. Formally, we represent the allocation of permits to
rm i by:
ai =
8><>: f(si; s i)A if
Pn
i=1 si > 0
~A
n
otherwise
for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (8)
where @ai
@si
 0, @2ai
@s2i
 0, si is rm is rent seeking e¤ort, s i =
Pn
j 6=i sj, A is the aggregate
emissions level given in (1) with ~A = ~A0. From (8), f(si; s i) is a share function with the
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following properties (See, for example a contest success function, Skaperdas, (1996)):5
@f
@si
> 0;
@2f
@s2i
< 0
@f
@s i
< 0;
nX
i=1
f(si; s i) = 1 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (9)
From (1), (8) and (9) observe that ai is increasing in si and decreasing in s i. As shown
above, rent seeking allows each rm to capture a share of the "pie" and simultaneously increase
the aggregate emissions cap.
4.1 Rent seeking under a non-tradable rent
To better understand the process of rent seeking for tradable permits, it is benecial to con-
sider, for a moment, the case where rents are not allowed to be ex post reallocated among rms.
This benchmark represents the traditional command-and-control regulation for pollution rights,
where rms are allocated the (non-tradable) right to pollute, such as performance-based stan-
dards (Freeman and Kolstad, 2008). To provide a meaningful comparison between rent seeking
for ex post reallocated and standard (command-and-control) rents, we assume for the bench-
mark, that agents rent-seek for a non-tradable rent, denoted by ~A. It follows then that the
payo¤ function for the rm is:
aBi   v(si) (10)
where ai is the non-tradable benet to rm i determined by:
aBi =
8><>: f(si; s i)
~A if
Pn
i=1 si > 0
~A
n
otherwise
(11)
Given (10) and (11), the rst order condition with respect to rm is rent seeking e¤ort si
is:
f 0(si; s i) ~A  v0(si) = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (12)
which is optimally solved for sBi , the optimal rent seeking e¤ort when the rents are not tradable.
In the benchmark model, (12) shows that each rm will rent-seek so that their marginal
5Throughout the paper we use the interpretation of a divisible prize among agents. However, provided risk
neutrality of the agents, a non-divisible rent, where there is a non-zero probability of winning, is functionally
equivalent. Therefore, the alternative interpretation of this model is where agents participate in a contest for a
single prize which can then be ex post reallocated after initial distribution.
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benet is equal to the marginal cost.
4.2 Equilibrium e¤ort
We now consider an alternative to this benchmark where the rent can be ex post reallocated
and rms invest in rent seeking e¤ort where each rm has the potential to not only inuence
their own allowance of permits but, from (1), the aggregate allocation. This means that the
permit price is endogenously determined by the level of aggregate allocation and hence the level
of aggregate rent seeking e¤ort.
Firm i now selects a level of rent seeking to maximise its payo¤:
max
si
p(ai   ei (A(si)))  v(si)  ci(ei (A(si))) (13)
where ei (A) is the equilibrium level of emissions chosen in stage three, ai is given by (8) and
v(si) is the (separable) cost of investing in rent seeking e¤ort where v0(si); v00(si)  0 and
v(0) = 0. Di¤erentiating (13) with respect to si and noting from (3) that in the perfectly
competitive market we have @ci
@ei
= p so that p @e

i
@si
= c0i(ei(A(si))) we obtain the following rst
order condition:6
p
@ai
@si
+
@p
@A
@A
@si
(ai   ei )  v0(si) = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (14)
where
@ai
@si
= f 0(si; s i)A(s) + f(si; s i)A0(s) (15)
To begin our discussion on rent seeking strategies under ex post reallocation, note that (14)
illustrates two important marginal e¤ects on rm is rent seeking e¤ort. The rst term in (14)
shows a positive marginal e¤ect where a unilateral increase in rm is rent seeking will increase
its permit allocation and wealth, given the permit price p. From (15) one can see, from the
rst term, that this positive marginal inuence is based on the marginal increase in rm is
share of permits (given a xed allocation) and, from the second term, a marginal increase in
permits from an increase in the aggregate cap (given a constant share of permits). The e¤ect
6The second order conditions are satised for su¢ ciently small (absolute) values of @
2p
@A2 . We assume through-
out that the second order conditions are satised at the optimal levels.
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of the second term in (14) is ambiguous and directly related to ex post reallocation. As will be
discussed further below, when rent seeking increases this may increase the aggregate emissions
cap which will reduce the equilibrium permit price. This is a positive marginal e¤ect when the
rm is an ex post net buyer of permits (i.e. ai   ei < 0), as permits now become cheaper to
purchase. However, if the rm is an ex post net seller of permits (i.e. ai  ei > 0) this marginal
e¤ect is negative as the additional permits sold are now sold at a lower price. It follows from
(14) that net buyers of permits tend to invest more in rent seeking than net sellers of permits.
This result shows that allowing ex post reallocation in the form of a tradable permit market for
rents creates a situation where equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort is now dependent on equilibrium
rents held. Comparing our model with the standard rent seeking benchmark, we are able to
show the relative size of rent seeking e¤ort in a tradable permit market:
Proposition 1 If pA(s) > ~A then aggregate rent seeking for the endogenous rent is larger
than the benchmark (s > sB). If pA(s) < ~A then aggregate rent seeking for the endogenous
rent is smaller (larger) than the benchmark for relatively small (large) levels of pA0(s).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 illustrates that when pA(s) > A then the value of the rent to the rm under
a tradable permit market is larger than the value of the rent under the benchmark and hence
rms will invest relatively more in rent seeking e¤ort. Note here that the implicit value of the
allocation in the benchmark model has been normalised to one. It is clear that A(s)  ~A
as A0(s)  0 and A(0) = ~A, however, it is ambiguous whether the equilibrium price level,
due to this increase supply of permits, is either larger or smaller than the normalised marginal
benet in the benchmark model. Let us now consider the case when pA(s) < ~A where the
value of the aggregate emissions cap is less than the value of the benchmark rent. In this case,
the responsiveness of the equilibrium permit price plays a fundamental role in determining the
relative size of rent seeking e¤ort. From the appendix, the relative size of rent seeking is given
by the term
h
~A  pA(s)
iPn
i=1 f
0(si ; s

 i) pA0(s) which shows that the relative size of rent
seeking e¤ort is ambiguous. One can see that as the di¤erence between the di¤erent rent values
~A  pA(s) increases then rent seeking e¤ort will tend to decrease. This tends to occur more
severely when the permit price is more responsive to changes in allocation.
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4.3 An exogenous rent
To see the incentive for rms to invest in rent seeking e¤orts more clearly, let us assume, for the
moment, that the aggregate emissions cap is equal to the initial declared level (draft legislation),
and not inuenced by rent seeking. That is, the aggregate cap A = ~A where  = 0. Under
such a scenario, the regulators aggregate emissions are unresponsive to rent seeking, however,
the distribution of rents among rms is still determined by rent seeking. With an equilibrium
permit price p, we can directly compare rmsrent seeking strategies from the exogenous rent
si and the benchmark model.
Corollary 1 For an exogenously determined aggregate emissions cap, if (i) p < 1 then s <
sB and (ii) p > 1 then s > sB and the relative aggregate rent seeking e¤ort is given by
[1  p]Pni=1 @ai@si .
Proof. See Appendix A.
This shows that as the marginal value of the ex post reallocated rent (p) is smaller than the
marginal benet from the benchmark (normalised to 1), then equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort will
be smaller than the benchmark case and vice versa. Additional to this, the aggregate marginal
allocation from rent seeking
Pn
i
@ai
@si
augments the relative di¤erence in rent seeking. This
result is in line with standard rent seeking literature that explains that a larger value of rent
will increase the amount of rent seeking. However, what is more interesting, and important to
our model is the extent to which the price changes, as this determines the level of rent seeking
activity. In order to view the consequences of a changing market value of rents we now turn to
the analysis of aggregate rent seeking e¤ort.
4.4 Aggregate rent seeking e¤ort
From the viewpoint of the regulator, we only care about aggregate rent seeking and the e¤ect it
may have on the aggregate emissions cap and social welfare. Therefore, we rst need to nd the
optimal rent seeking strategy for the entire market in stage two. To do this, we use a Tullock
(1980) contest model (for surveys, see, for example, Nitzan, 1994; Konrad, 2009). Following
convention, for risk neutral rms and constant returns to rent seeking, the initial allocation to
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rm i in (8) is now transformed to:
ai =
8><>:
siPn
i si
A if
Pn
i=1 si > 0
~A
n
otherwise
for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (16)
which shows that allocation to rm i is based on their relative size of rent seeking e¤orts. That
is, each rms initial allocation is proportional to their investment in rent seeking e¤ort.
Using the rst order condition (14), summing over all n rst order conditions and noting the
elimination of the second term due to the market clearing condition (4) assuming symmetric
strategies in rent seeking s = si = s i, aggregate rent seeking is given by:
S = p
(n  1)
n
~A0
1  p ~A0 (17)
for p ~A0 < 1 where the marginal increase in value of the ex post reallocated rent p ~A0 is lower
than the marginal cost of rent seeking, otherwise agents would choose the maximum possible
level of resource-seeking. Applying (16) to the benchmark model in (11) yields the familiar
aggregate rent seeking strategy SB = (n 1)
n
~A0. The major distinction between this and our ex
post reallocation rent seeking strategy is that our model now includes the equilibrium permit
price as the market value for the ex post reallocation rent. Comparative statics of the aggregate
equilibrium rent seeking strategy, yields:
@S
@p
=
(n  1)
n
~A0
1  p ~A0
2 > 0 (18)
@S
@
= 	
(n  1)
n
~A0
1  p ~A0
2 (19)
where
	 =

@p
@A
@A
@
+ ~A0(p)2

As suggested above, and now shown in equation (18), an (exogenous) increase in the equi-
librium permit price will increase aggregate rent seeking e¤ort, as the ex post reallocated rents
increase in value.
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Let us consider the response to a regulators exogenously changing responsiveness  in (19).
From	 there are two e¤ects on marginal rent seeking. First, from (1) and (7) we dene the Price
E¤ect as @p
@A
@A
@
so that as the regulators responsiveness increases, this may increase the number
of permits which has the potential to reduce the equilibrium price experienced and decrease
rent seeking e¤ort. In the analysis of standard rents, this e¤ect does not exist. The second
component ~A0p2 > 0 we denote as the Wealth E¤ect where, if the regulators responsiveness
increases then rent-seekers have a larger number of permits and increased wealth. Therefore,
when 	 > 0, the wealth e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect and marginal rent seeking e¤ort is
positive

@S
@
> 0

whereas when 	 < 0 the price e¤ect dominates the wealth e¤ect which
results in negative marginal rent seeking activity

@S
@
< 0

.
Di¤erentiating the aggregate rent seeking strategy (17) with respect to the regulators op-
timal allocation choice, reveals, after some manipulation:
@S
@ ~A0
=
(n  1)
n
p
[1 + "p]
1  p ~A0
2 (20)
where "p =
@p
@ ~A0
~A0
p is the elasticity of the equilibrium price level based on a change in the
regulators aggregate allocation choice.7 From (20), note that we can again see the di¤erence
between ex post reallocated rents and standard rents. In standard rents, @S

@ ~A0
is always positive
as the increase in rent increases wealth. However, from (20), we see that the size of "p will
determine whether @S

@ ~A0
is positive or negative. Importantly, we nd increasing the size of the
rent (here, the total supply of permits) has an ambiguous e¤ect on rent seeking. This is in
direct contrast to frameworks that investigate standard rents (Sha¤er, 2006).
To compare aggregate rent seeking e¤ort under exogenous and endogenous cases note ag-
gregate rent seeking for an exogenously determined rent is:
S = p
(n  1)
n
~A0 (21)
where the superscript  denotes the exogenous case. Therefore, comparing (17) and (21),
the relative di¤erence in aggregate rent seeking e¤orts between exogenous and endogenous
7Note this is the inverse of a standard price elasticity of demand.
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determined ex post reallocated rents is given by:
S
S
=
p
p
1
1  p ~A0 (22)
Expression (22) shows that the relative di¤erence between rents that are exogenous and endoge-
nously determined is based on the two e¤ects discussed above. Firstly, we know that p

p  1
as, by denition, the aggregate cap chosen in the endogenous case must be at least the size
of the exogenous cap. Therefore from (7), the permit price must be relatively smaller which
results in greater pressure for rent seeking e¤ort in the case of the exogenously determined cap.
Second, 1
1 p ~A0  1 which increases rent seeking for the endogenously determined rent as more
permits are allowed which provide additional wealth. To what extent rent seeking e¤orts are
larger in exogenous or endogenously determined aggregate emissions caps therefore depends on
the relative size of these two e¤ects.
5 Stage one: regulators optimal choice of aggregate emis-
sions
In stage one, the regulator will select a level of aggregate emissions ~A. As a consequence
the resulting aggregate emissions level will be determined by expression (1) so that A =
~A (1 + 
Pn
i=1 s

i ) where
Pn
i=1 s

i are the aggregate rent seeking e¤orts from stage two. Let us
initially assume that the regulator, such as the US EPA, is solely concerned about maximising
social welfare in that region. We return to the case where the regulator is concerned about the
attainment of political contributions at the end of this section.
5.1 The regulators optimal choice of aggregate emissions
The regulators aim is to maximise the net welfare W which consists of rmsnet prots from
the tradable permit market
Pn
i=1i(A) minus the damage from the emissions and the cost of
the (socially unproductive) rent seeking e¤ort. More formally, the regulators objective function
is:
max
~A
W =
nX
i=1
i(A) D(A)  V (A) (23)
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whereD(A) is the damage caused by emissions whereD0(A); D00(A)  0 and V (A) =Pni=1 v(si )
is the aggregate rent seeking cost from all rms participating in the tradable permit market.
Using backward induction, the regulator knows equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort by observing
(17) that occurs in stage two according to a given level of  and A. In order to show the
regulators optimal choice of allocation, it is important to compare this result to the socially
optimal case when there exists no rent seeking e¤ort. That is, what aggregate allocation level
would the regulator choose under the presence of zero rent seeking? As shown in Appendix B,
when zero rent seeking occurs the regulator selects an aggregate emissions cap so that:
p =
@D(A)
@A
(24)
which is optimally solved for ~AB (here we have @A
@ ~A
= 1 hence @D(A)
@A
= @D(A)
@ ~A
). This states
that the regulator should set a level of aggregate emissions so that the marginal benet (the
equilibrium permit price) is equated to the marginal damage of emissions.
In order to solve for the regulators optimal aggregate allocation in (23), we rst sum over
all rmsprot functions which gives  Pni=1 ci(ei) and di¤erentiating with respect to ~A yields:
 
nX
i=1
@ci
@e
@e
@A
@A
@ ~A
(25)
and using (3), this simplies to:
p
@A
@ ~A
nX
i=1
@ei
@A
(26)
and noting that @e

@A
= 1 this reduces to:8
@
@ ~A
 
nX
i=1
i(A)
!
= p
@A
@ ~A
(27)
Given that rms are risk neutral, it follows that V (A) =
Pn
i=1 v(s

i ) =
Pn
i=1 s

i = S
 can
be substituted into (23). Di¤erentiating (23) with respect to ~A and substituting in (27) yields
8Note that
Pn
i=1
@ei
@A =
Pn
i=1
24 1Pn
j=1
c00
i
(ei)
c00
j
(ej)
35 =Pni=1
24 1
c00i (ei)
1Pn
j=1

1
c00
j
(ej)

35 = 1Pn
j=1

1
c00
j
(ej)
 Pni=1  1c00i (ei) =
1
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the regulators rst order condition:9
p
@A
@ ~A
  @S

@A
@A
@ ~A
 D0(A)@A
@ ~A
= 0 (28)
Therefore ~A is chosen so that (28) holds. Note there are three inuences on the regulators
optimal choice of allocation. First there is an upward inuence in the form of marginal increase
in rmsprot due to the increased aggregate allocation p @A
@ ~A
. Further, @S

@A
@A
@ ~A
which is shown
in (20) has an ambiguous inuence in terms of the marginal change in optimal aggregate
rent seeking e¤ort and nally a downward inuence due to the additional damage produced.
Furthermore, we obtain an expression that allows analysis of the aggregate emissions level
chosen by the regulator:
Lemma 1 In the presence of rent seeking e¤ort, the regulators optimal choice of aggregate
allocation ~A is chosen so that:
p =
@D(A)
@A
(29)
where  =
"
1  (n 1)
n
[1+"p]
1+S

1+
[1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

(1 p ~A)2
#
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Direct comparison of (24) and (29) shows that the regulators choice of aggregate emissions
cap is only socially optimal when  = 1, that is j"pj = 1, where the responsiveness of the
permit price is unitary to changes in the regulators choice of allocation. When j"pj < 1, the
price is relatively insensitive which results in a relatively stable permit price and hence a stable
level of aggregate rent seeking. As a result, aggregate emissions tend to be smaller than socially
optimal as the regulator takes this into account and reduces the amount of permits available.
For j"pj > 1, we have to consider the sign of

1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

. In particular, this
can be rearranged so that we dene j"pj as the value of elasticity that solves:
[1 + "p] =  

1  p ~A0

(n  1)p ~A0
h
n  p ~A0
i
< 0 (30)
When 1 < j"pj < j"pj then we nd the regulator selects a level of aggregate emissions
above the socially optimal level. As the price is very responsive, aggregate emissions are above
9The second order conditions are satised for the optimal value given a su¢ ciently small (absolute) @
2S
@A2 .
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the socially optimal level because rent seeking e¤ort falls improving welfare which allows the
regulator to allocate more permits to the rms. Counter-intuitively, it is not the actual rent
seeking that increases the aggregate emissions but the reduction in social costs associated with a
reduction in rent seeking that allows the regulator to issue additional permits. For completeness,
we also have the case where j"pj > j"pj. In this case,the price is extremely sensitive, so much so
that, the regulators optimal choice of aggregate emissions is chosen below the socially optimal
level.
As the regulator understands that "unavoidable responsiveness" may exist, in that its draft
legislation may indeed increase in aggregate size throughout the political process, the regulator
combats this by using its rst mover advantage and adjusting the initial aggregate allocation
~A accordingly. Therefore, a lower initial aggregate allocation (than socially optimal) will be
chosen when it is anticipated that a signicant amount of rent seeking will occur in stage two
and vice versa (which can be determined by analysing the responsiveness of the equilibrium
permit price).
5.2 Regulatory responsiveness and welfare
From above, we were able to show that the regulators optimal choice of allocation depends
on how responsive the equilibrium permit price is to changing allocations. Another type of
responsiveness is that of the regulator towards the setting of the initial allocation. Can a
change in regulatory responsiveness (i.e. a change in rent seeking culture) change welfare?
That is, given the optimal regulators decision determined in (29), how does changing the
responsiveness parameter  alter welfare for society?
By solving for dW
d
we can show how the regulators responsiveness alters welfare.
Lemma 2 The welfare change given by an increase in the regulators responsiveness is:
dW
d
= [p  D0(A)] @A

@
  @S

@
Proof. See Appendix C.
From Lemma 2, two main factors determine whether increasing responsiveness changes
welfare. The rst term [p  D0(A)] @A
@
shows the distance away from the socially optimally
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chosen level of allocation which is derived in Lemma 1. Under a socially optimal emissions cap,
expression (24) shows that p D0(A) = 0. However, Lemma 1 shows that, in most cases this
tends to be non-zero. In fact when p  D0(A) < 0 emissions are larger than socially optimal
and smaller when p  D0(A) > 0. Second, the marginal change in rent seeking alters welfare.
Everything else constant, Lemma 2 shows that a reduction in rent seeking unambiguously
improves welfare. This is not surprising as rent seeking is a socially unproductive activity. For
@S
@
< 0 to hold, it follows from (19) that 	 < 0 which implies the price e¤ect is larger than the
wealth e¤ect. This requires the price change, due to a change in responsiveness and hence the
aggregate allocation, to be relatively elastic. As discussed above, if the equilibrium permit price
is relatively elastic, a change in the aggregate allocation of permits will reduce the price (value)
of the permits substantially and rms will have an incentive to reduce rent seeking e¤ort.
Now let us consider the di¤erence in optimally chosen aggregate emissions when 	 < 0.
It is easy to show in these conditions that the equilibrium permit is relatively elastic j"pj > 1
and using Lemma 1 it possible that p   D0(A) < 0 which has a negative e¤ect on welfare.
From Lemma 2 it is clear that the optimally chosen emissions and the change in rent seeking
activity may work in opposite directions. For instance, when a reduction in rent seeking occurs,
emissions tend to be pushed above the socially optimal level. From Lemma 2 it is unclear as
to the net e¤ect on welfare given a change in responsiveness. The e¤ects of an increase in
regulatory responsiveness on welfare is given by the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 For an exogenous increase in regulatory responsiveness , (i) welfare decreases
when j"pj < 1 and j"pj < j"^pj (ii) welfare increases for j"pj > j"^pj where j"^pj solves the equality:
(n  1)
n
=

1  p ~A
2

1  p ~A
2
  p ~A [1 + "p]
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 2 shows that given the balance between the distortion in aggregate emissions
and marginal rent seeking observed in Lemma 2, an increase in the regulatory responsiveness
will unambiguously decrease welfare when j"pj < j"^pj and j"pj < 1. That is, the increase in the
emissions (away from the socially optimal level) will be greater than the improvement caused
by a reduction in rent seeking e¤ort. We nd that as the number of rms participating in rent
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seeking increases, the decrease in welfare will become smaller. Intuitively, when more rms
rent seek there is a larger social loss created by that rent seeking. Therefore when regulatory
responsiveness increases, the change in aggregate rent seeking is larger and net welfare decreases
by less.
However, when the price is su¢ ciently elastic, j"pj > j"^pj, then it is possible for social welfare
to increase as the reduction in socially wasteful rent seeking outweighs the increase in damages
from aggregate emissions.
5.3 The regulator and political contributions
Up to this point, we have considered a regulator that acts benevolently by selecting a level of
aggregate emissions to maximise social welfare where it views rent seeking as socially wasteful.
However, it is clear that regulators (politicians) may obtain a benet in the form of political con-
tributions which may alter the incentives to select the level of aggregate emissions (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994). In this subsection, we extend our model by allowing the regulator to op-
timise the standard social welfare function with the additional (weighted) political contribution
benets.
To show this, let us assume that the regulator obtains political contributions from rent
seekers given by S where  > 0 is an exogenous parameter representing the weight to which
the regulator can attain political contributions from rent seekers. From the regulators payo¤
function in (23) we know that the net gain from rent seeking is given by  (1 )S. When 0 <
 < 1 the net benet from the political contributions is negative and similar (but augmented)
results are found to the case when the regulator attains no political contributions. However
when  > 1 the net benets of attaining political contributions are positive and additional
results exist. In particular, the regulators choice of emissions is now determined by
p
26641 + (   1)(n  1)n [1 + "p]
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A
2
3775 = D0(A) (31)
Let us assume that  <  where  is the maximum level in which the left hand side is
positive. It follows that:
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Corollary 2 For, 1 <  < , (i) When j"pj < 1 or j"pj < j"pj then p   D0(A) < 0 and
emissions are higher than optimal (ii) If j"pj > j"pj > 1 then p D0(A) > 0 and emissions are
lower than optimal
Proof. See Appendix D.
In contrast to the previous case, Corollary 2 now shows that the regulator has an incentive to
increase emissions when the elasticity "p (given a change in the allocation) is inelastic j"pj < 1.
Intuitively, as the price is unresponsive, an increase in emissions results in only a small decrease
in price and consequently rent seeking e¤ort continues to be relatively large which produces
a large amount of political contributions for the regulator. Similar logic applies when j"pj >
j"pj > 1 and an incentive exists to reduce the aggregate level of emissions. For the extreme case
where j"pj > j"pj the regulator selects a level of emissions above the socially optimal level.
We can also consider the e¤ect on the regulators payo¤ when there is a change in the
exogenous parameter . Unlike the case where there are no political contributions, we nd:
Proposition 3 Given the regulator receives political contributions where 1 <  <  then the
regulators payo¤ (i) increases when j"pj < 1 and j"pj < j"^pj, (ii) welfare decrease for j"pj > j"^pj
where j"^pj is a threshold elasticity value.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Under a regime in which regulators are responsive, we nd that an increase in the respon-
siveness to rent seekers, in terms of changing social norms and so on, will usually result in
the regulators payo¤ increasing. Here the benets obtained from the political contributions
outweigh the increase in damages. Similarly, the elasticity could be so high that political
contributions fall signicantly so that the regulators payo¤ decreases.
6 Discussion
The incentive to rent seek for tradable pollution permit di¤ers from traditional rents in that
the market for permits produces an equilibrium permit price which inuences the rent seeking
incentives of rms and the selection of aggregate emissions by the regulator. This is clearly
seen when one considers a regime where regulatory responsiveness exists. The responsiveness
of the regulator can be viewed as a stabilisation or deterrent against "excessive" rent seeking.
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If rent seeking increases this has a knock-on-e¤ect on the aggregate supply to the market and
as a result reduces the value of permits. However, even if rent seeking is stablised under a
tradable permit market, allowing regulatory responsiveness is usually welfare decreasing.
From (7) we can see that the change in the equilibrium permit price is based on the slopes
of rmsmarginal abatement cost functions. That is, relatively steeper marginal abatement
costs functions (i.e. each additional unit of abatement is relatively more expensive), result
in a more responsive equilibrium permit price. Therefore, it follows that in markets where
rmsmarginal abatement cost functions are steep and rent seeking is a signicant and costly
problem, a regulator will decrease welfare when regulatory responsiveness exists.10 Considering
current tradable permit markets, permit prices do seem to be relatively responsive to market
conditions. For example, EU-ETS allowance prices have had signicant volatility since their
inception. The most noticeable change occurred in April-May 2006 with a signicant drop
in equilibrium permit prices due to additional information being released regarding Member
Statesover-allocation of emissions (Ellerman et al., 2007).
To the extent that di¤erent political regimes allow di¤ering regulatory responsiveness, it is
clear that for welfare to improve, the regulatory responsiveness should be low as possible in
determining the aggregate emissions (for inelastic and elastic prices up to a threshold level).
Ideally, the ex-ante creation of market rules should help restrict the possible consequences of rent
seeking, yet this may prove hard to implement as it may be hard to identify whether rm actions
are rm/industry participation in creating realistic targets or simply rent seeking for additional
permits and aggregate emissions. An important distinction exists between allowing the rms
to determine the aggregate emissions cap through rent seeking and the recent arguments for
allowing exible absolute emissions caps. These ideas suggest introducing energy intensity
targets instead of absolute emission targets to help maintain growth levels in economies and
reduce uncertainty (Fischer, 2003; Kolstad, 2005; Pizer, 2005) or even using "reserves" or
"safety valves" to reduce price volatility and improve the cost e¤ectiveness of tradable permit
markets (Pizer, 1999; 2002; Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004; Newell et al., 2005).
10Steep marginal abatement cost may actually cause signicant amounts of rent-seeking as these rms tend
to nd investment in abatement relatively expensive and are more likely to consider invest in rent-seeking as
an alternative.
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7 Conclusion
A contentious and demanding aspect of a regulators role in a tradable permit market is the
initial allocation of permits. In particular, the determination of the aggregate emissions cap and
the distribution of permits among participants remain controversial issues. Like most valuable
rents, a signicant amount of rent seeking e¤ort tends to be employed to inuence both the size
and the distribution of the rent. Yet in contrast to traditional contestable rents, tradable rents,
such as tradable pollution permits, allow for ex post reallocation. Therefore, it is important to
understand how this alters agentsincentives to rent seek.
We introduce a contest where polluting rms in a tradable permit market have the option
to invest in rent seeking e¤ort that has the potential to increase (i) their own permit allocation
within the tradable permit market and (ii) the aggregate supply of permits from the regulator
(i.e. political pressure to increase the aggregate level of emissions). The regulator selects a
provisional aggregate emissions target but this can be inuenced by rmsrent seeking e¤ort.
We analyse two cases where the regulator views rent seeking as purelysocially wasteful and
where the regulator obtains political contributions from rent seekers. We show the incentives
behind rmsrent seeking e¤ort in a tradable permit market and compare this to a standard
rent seeking framework. We nd individual rent seeking strategies depend on whether, in
equilibrium, the rm is a net buyer or seller of the ex post reallocated rent (initial allocation
of permits).
In a tradable permit market, a regulator must understand the e¤ects of rent seeking on the
equilibrium permit price (and thus the value of the ex post reallocated rent) and the social loss
created by rent seeking. This paper shows that, although the equilibrium permit price e¤ect
has the potential to reduce socially wasteful rent seeking e¤ort, it cannot usually improve net
welfare when the regulators responsiveness to aggregate rent seeking increases.
Using this model allows direct comparison between standard and ex post reallocated rents,
such as tradable pollution permits. Importantly, it is this ability of rms to bargain the ex post
reallocated rents that denes the incentives to rent-seek. Allowing ex post reallocation creates
a price e¤ect that inuences the equilibrium levels of rent seeking not seen in the traditional
contestable rents story. As the market value of the rent is linked to the supply of permits, when
a regulator is responsive to rent seeking this then acts as a type of stabilisation or deterrent
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against rent seeking as any increase in rent seeking will result in a reduction in the value of the
rent.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The rst order condition, with respect to rent seeking e¤ort, is:
0 =
@p
@A
A0(s)(f(si ; s

 i)A(s
)  ei) + (A1)
+p()

f 0(si ; s

 i)A(s
) + f(si ; s

 i)A
0(s)
  v0(si )
which is solved for rm is rent seeking strategy si . Substituting this level of rent seeking into
the benchmark rst order condition we obtain:
0 6= f 0(si ; s i) ~A  v0(si ) (A2)
substituting (A1) into (A2), yields:
f 0(si ; s

 i) ~A 
264 @p@AA0(s)(f(si ; s i)A(s)  ei)+
+p()

f 0(si ; s

 i)A(s
) + f(si ; s

 i)A
0(s)

375 6= 0
h
~A  pA(s)
i
f 0(si ; s

 i) 

@p
@A
(a   ei) + p()f(si ; s i)

A0(s) 6= 0
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summing up over the n rst order conditions, we obtain:
nX
i=1
[A  pA(s)] f 0(si ; s i)  p
nX
i=1
f(si ; s

 i)A
0(s)
h
~A  pA(s)
i nX
i=1
f 0(si ; s

 i)  pA0(s)
nX
i=1
f(si ; s

 i)
Note that from (9),
Pn
i f(s

i ; s

 i) = 1 which gives:
h
~A  pA(s)
i nX
i=1
f 0(si ; s

 i)  pA0(s)
As A0(s) > 0, it follows that when ~A   pA(s) < 0 then
h
~A  pA(s)
iPn
i=1 f
0(si ; s

 i)  
pA0(s) < 0 and due to the concavity of f(:) and convexity of v(:), it follows that s > sB.
When ~A  pA(s) > 0; then the opposite result can be found as long as pA0(s) is su¢ ciently
small so that
h
~A  pA(s)
iPn
i f
0(si ; s

 i)  pA0(s) > 0. In such a case s < sB.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. Substituting A = ~A into the proof of Proposition 1 and noting that A0(s) = 0 we nd
[1  p]
nX
i=1
f 0(si ; s

 i) ~A 6= 0
hence if p > 1 then s > sB and if p < 1 then s < sB. Summing up over all rms we
obtain the total di¤erence between rent seeking e¤ort between the benchmark model and the
exogenously determined emissions cap:
nX
i=1
[1  p] f 0(si ; s i) ~A = [1  p]
nX
i=1
@ai
@si
6= 0
Appendix B
Proof of derivation for regulators benchmark case:
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Proof. For zero rent seeking activity, rm i objective function is:
i = p
(ai   ei )  ci(ei )
for optimal choices (ei ; a

i ). So the social welfare function is:
max
~A
W =
nX
i=1
i  D(A)
We also know that ai = A=N = ~A=N and
@A
@ ~A
= 1. The rst order condition is:
@i
@ ~A
=
@p
@ ~A
(ai   ei ) + p(1=N  
@e
@p
@p
@ ~A
)  @ci
@e
@e
@p
@p
@ ~A
which can be reduced by using (3) so that we now have
@i
@ ~A
=
@p
@ ~A
(ai   ei ) + p=N
Summing this over all rms we get:
nX
i=1
@i
@ ~A
= p
substituting this into the regulators welfare function we obtain:
p = D0(A)
Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Noting @A
@ ~A
= 1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

and substituting (20) into (28) yields:
np
0@1 + S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A (n  1)
n
p
[1 + "p]
1  p ~A
2 = D0(A)1+S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A
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rearranging gives:
p
26641  (n  1)n [1 + "p]
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A
2
3775 = D0(A)
as required.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. By totally di¤erentiating (23) with respect to  we obtain:
dW
d
=
@W
@
+
@W
@ ~A
d ~A
d
where ~A is the optimally chosen allocation level given by Lemma 1. Now given the Envelope
Theorem, this is reduced to
dW
d
=
@W
@

~A= ~A
where we hold ~A xed at the optimal level ~A. This also means that S is xed at the optimal
level. Working out the components we have:
@i
@
=
@p
@A
@A
@
(ai   ei ) + p(
@ai
@A
@A
@
  @e

@p
@p
@A
@A
@
)  @ci
@e
@e
@p
@p
@A
@A
@
which is simplied to:
@i
@
=
@p
@A
@A
@
(ai   ei ) + p
@ai
@A
@A
@
and summing over all rms:
nX
i=1
@i
@
= p
nX
i=1
@ai
@A
@A
@
= p
@A
@
which is substituted in to yield:
dW
d
= p
@A
@
  @S

@
 D0(A)@A

@
Noting @A

@
from (1) gives
dW
d
= [p  D0(A)] @A

@
  @S

@
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where @S

@
is given by (19).
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. From Lemma (1), we can solve for the distortion between equilibrium permit price and
marginal damage to nd:
p  D0(A) = (n  1)
n
p
[1 + "p]
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A
2
and given the equilibrium rent seeking strategy in (17) this can be rearranged to:
p  D0(A) = S
 [1 + "p]
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A

~A
(A3)
Similarly we nd:
@S
@
=
S	
p

1  p ~A
 (A4)
For both (A3) and (A4) they can be positive or negative. Further, as a consequence of the
Envelope Theorem the values of the regulators initial allocation and rmsrent seeking are
xed at their optimal levels. Hence, we nd that
@A
@
= ~AS (A5)
By substituting (A3), (A4) and (A5) into Lemma 2 welfare is improving under an increased
responsiveness when:
S [1 + "p] ~AS
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A

~A
  S
	
p

1  p ~A
 > 0
multiplying by

1  p ~A

, p and

1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

and dividing by S this ex-
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pression simplies to:
pS [1 + "p] 	
0@1 + S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A > 0
which is rearranged:
pS  	+ S
0@p"p   	
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A > 0 (A6)
The third term can be simplied so that
p"p   	
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A = p @p
@ ~A
~A
p
  

@p
@A
@A
@
+ ~A(p)2
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A
=
@p
@ ~A
~A   

@p
@A
~AS + ~A(p)2

 


@p
@A
~AS + ~A(p)2
0@ [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A
= ~A

@p
@ ~A
  S @p

@A
  (p)2

 
~A

S
@p
@A
+ (p)2
0@ [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A
from the chain rule we know that @p

@ ~A =
@p
@A
@A
@ ~A =
@p
@A (1 + S


1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

) substituting
in we nd:
~A
0@ @p
@A
(1 + S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A)  S @p
@A
  (p)2
1A 
~A

S
@p
@A
+ (p)2
0@ [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A
=) ~A
264 @p@A + S @p@A + S @p@A [1+"p](1 p ~A) 
S @p

@A   (p)2   S @p

@A
[1+"p]
(1 p ~A)   (p
)2 [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)
375
=) ~A
24 @p
@A
  (p)2
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35
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which gives:
p"p   	
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A = ~A
24 @p
@A
  (p)2
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35 (A7)
Substituting (A7) into (A6), we obtain the expression:
pS  	+ S
0@p"p   	
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A > 0
pS  

@p
@A
@A
@
+ ~A(p)2

+ S ~A
24 @p
@A
  (p)2
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35 > 0
pS   @p

@A
(S ~A   S ~A)  ~A(p)2 + S ~A
24 (p)2
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35 > 0
pS   ~A(p)2 + S ~A
24 (p)2
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35 > 0
S   ~Ap + S ~A
24 p
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35 > 0
S
241  p ~A
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A35 > ~Ap
S
264

1  p ~A
2
  ~Ap [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

375 > ~Ap
which yields:
S >
~Ap
(1 p ~A)2  ~Ap[1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

Hence, from (17) we know that for welfare to increase given an increase in responsiveness
the following must hold:
S  (n  1)
n
~Ap
1  p ~A
 > ~Ap
(1 p ~A)2  ~Ap[1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

=) (n  1)
n
>

1  p ~A
2

1  p ~A
2
  p ~A [1 + "p]
31
this does not hold when j"pj < 1 so that welfare is decreasing in regulatory responsiveness.
However, for j"pj > 1 It follows that increasing regulatory responsiveness is ambiguous and
depends on the value of j"pj.
Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. The regulators payo¤ from aggregate rent seeking is given by (   1)S. Substituting
(   1)@S
@ ~A
for @S

@ ~A
in the proof of Lemma 1 yields the results.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Substituting (   1)@S
@
into Lemma 2 yields:
dW
d
= [p  D0(A)] @A

@
+ (   1)@S

@
(A8)
Substituting (31) into (A8) and noting the similarity to Proposition 2 we obtain:
 (   1)S [1 + "p] ~AS
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A

~A
+
(   1)S	
p

1  p ~A
 <
>
0 (A9)
we can be rearranged to give:
pS [1 + "p] 	
0@1 + S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A >
<
0
The results follow from the proof given in Proposition 2.
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